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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES FLOYD,
Appellant,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 870284

WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR.,
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., and
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,

Case Pjriority No. 14(b)

Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES
AND DR. MARTIN C. LINDEM
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKfe COUNTY
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the lower court properly determined that there

were no genuine issues of fact and that respondents Dr. Lindem
and Western Surgical Associates, Inc. were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because appellant discoyered, or through the
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that he
sustained an injury and that such injury was allegedly caused
by negligent action more than two years before he commenced an
action against health care providers?
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II.

Whether appellant's attempt to manufacture an issue of

fact through his own post-deposition contradictory affidavit
should be disregarded?
III.

Whether appellant improperly addresses the

constitutionality of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act for
the first time on appeal?
IV.

Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah

Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended):
(A)

bars appellant's claim for failure to bring such

claim within two years as prescribed by the Act;
(B)

avoids characterization as a constitutionally

defective "special law;"
(C)

satisfies constitutional requirements of the due

process, open courts and equal protection provisions of the
Utah Constitution, and/or the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
(D)

Satisfies Constitutional requirements by ration-

ally relating and furthering to the legislative objectives
underlying the statute?
DISPOSITIVE STATUTORY PROVISION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action brought by appellant
Charles Floyd to recover damages for injuries he claims to have
-2-

sustained as the result of allegedly negligent treatment
rendered on December 10, 1981 by Dr. Mart|in C. Lindem.

(Record

at 2-20.)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted respondents' motion to dismiss
appellant's complaint for the reason that appellant's claims
are barred by the statute of limitations set forth in the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act ("The Act"), IJTtah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4 (1987), L. 1976 ch. 23.

(Record at 186-87.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant Charles Floyd sought medical treatment for

"stomach problems," diagnosed as a hiatal hernia condition
which resulted in his hospitalization on December 9, 1981 and
surgery by Dr. Martin C. Lindem which was conducted on
December 10, 1981.
2.

(Record at 3-4.)

Appellant testified that prior to his operation, the

only surgical procedure that he discussed with Dr. Lindem was a
hiatal hernia operation.

Appellant also testified that

Dr. Lindem did not ever mention any surgery for ulcer disease.
(Record at 199; and Deposition of Charles Floyd, ("Floyd Depo.")
at 83:14-24; 84:10-25; 85:1-5; and 88:6-9.)
3.

Appellant testified that his discussions with

Dr. Wilcox prior to his referral to Dr. Lindem and prior to the
operation were limited to diagnosis and treatment of a hiatal
-3-

hernia condition.

(Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at 111:23-25;

112:1-25; and 113:1-4.)
4.

Based on conversations with Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Lindem,

appellant understood, as early as November of 1981, that surgery for a hiatal hernia condition (fundoplication) is limited
to repair of "a tear between the esophagus and the stomach,"
(Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at 83:20.) and that such
procedure does not involve cutting nerves on the stomach, or
enlarging the opening between the stomach and the duodenum.
Appellant knew that fundoplication simply involves "stretch[ing]
the stomach up over the esophagus and [tying] it in."

(Record

at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 83:16-22; 111:23-25; 112:1-25.)
5.

Appellant testified that he consented to have only the

hiatal hernia (fundoplication) surgical procedure performed.
(Record at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 88:6-20.)
6.

By March or April of 1982, appellant knew that

Dr. Lindem had performed the following surgical procedures on
December 10, 1981:

(1) fundoplication (the procedure described

by both Dr. Lindem and Dr. Wilcox of tying a portion of the
stomach around the distal end of the esophagus to prevent
stomach contents from going into the esophagus); (2) vagotomy
(severance of the vagus nerves to the stomach to reduce stomach
acid secretions to correct ulcer diseases); and (3) pyloroplasty
(enlarging the opening from the stomach to the duodenum to
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allow stomach contents to empty more rapidly.) (Record at 199;
Floyd Depo., pp. 85, 88; 96:15-21; 97:2-2J5 and 98:1-2.)
7.

Appellant alleged that Dr. Lindefn performed unauthor-

ized surgical procedures and did not inform appellant of risks
related to such procedures.
8.

(Record at 2-20.)

Appellant experienced unexpected symptoms immediately

following the surgery performed by Dr. Lindem, including
diarrhea, stomach pain, weight loss and depression.

(Record at

116-18 and Floyd Depo. at 91:1-25; 92:1-9,)
9.

Appellant understood in March or April of 1982 that

the unexpected symptoms he was experiencing, (diarrhea, upset
stomach, weight loss and depression) were attributable to
Dr. Lindem's performance of surgical procedures other than the
hiatal hernia operation.

(Record at 116-18 and Floyd Depo. at

99-101.)
10.

In March or April of 1982, appellant discovered an

alleged legal injury (unauthorized surgery) and attributed the
cause thereof to alleged negligent conduct of respondents.
(Record at 116-18 and Floyd Depo. at 96:2-25; 96:2-25; 98:1-2.)
11.

Appellant consulted Dr. Wilcox in September 1982

because of persistent health problems which appellant allegedly
experienced following the 1981 surgery.

Appellant explained to

Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem had performed additional surgery
(vagotomy and pyloroplasty) on him.
Depo. at 99:14-25; 100:1-19.)
-5-

(Recofd at 199 and Floyd

12.

Dr. Wilcox was amazed to learn that Dr. Lindem had

performed more extensive surgery than simply repairing the
hiatal hernia.

Dr. Wilcox told appellant that he had "dumping

syndrome," which is an accelerated stomach emptying rate which
appellant was told he should not have experienced as a result
of a hiatal hernia operation.

Dr. Wilcox also informed

appellant that surgery might be necessary to resolve the
dumping syndrome problem.

(Record at 118, 199 and Floyd Depo.

at 99:14-25; 100:1; 101:9-11; 117 and 118.)
13.

Despite the fact that, in 1982, appellant was aware of

injuries and symptoms relating to allegedly unauthorized surgery and their cause, he failed to commence this action until
November 27, 1985, more than two years after the appellant
discovered or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered his legal injuries and their possible cause.
(Record at 4.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled, as a matter of law, that
the claims of appellant Charles Floyd are completely timebarred by the two year statute of limitations contained in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987).

Appellant's own testimony demon-

strates discovery of an alleged injury and its cause more than
two years prior to commencement of this action against health
care providers.

Nothing more is required to begin the running
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of the applicable two year statute of limitations.

In spite of

these acknowledged discoveries, appellant did not commence the
instant action until more than three years had elapsed.
Appellant cannot enliven his stale claim by asserting that
the health care providers involved indicated that appellant's
condition would improve with time or that appellant did know
the full extent of his injuries because "[t]o adopt such
reasoning would, in practical effect, wipe out the statute."
Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986).

Likewise,

appellant's attempts to manufacture an issue of fact through
unexplained post deposition contradictions should not be
considered.

"A contrary rule would undermine the utility of

summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of
fact."

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).

When appellant learned of information that would lead to the
discovery of the cause of action through diligence, the statue
of limitations begins to run regardless of concealment.
Appellant cannot create issues of fact through contradition.
Because appellant knew or should have known that he suffered
an alleged legal injury, the trial court's application of
Section 78-14-4 to time bar appellant's cause of action is
wholly consistent with this Court's decision in Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
Finally, because appeallant failed to present any constitutional argument to the trial court, this Court cannot consider
-7-

such arguments for the first time on appeal.

Nevertheless,

Section 78-14-4 is a constitutionally valid enactment,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS BECAUSE APPELLANT'S
CLAIMS ARE ABSOLUTELY TIME-BARRED BY SECTION
78-14-4 OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE
ACT.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
dispute as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Horgan v. Industrial Design

Corp. , 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

See also Celotex Corp.

In the instant case, the

trial court granted respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment,
ruling that appellant's claim should be dismissed because he:
discovered or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered that he had sustained
an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent
action more than two years before he commenced an
action against the health care providers. . . .
(Record at 186-87.)
A.

See Addendum at A-l

Appellant's Claims Are Completely Time-Barred Because,
By Appellant's Own Admission, He Had Knowledge Of The
Performance Of Allegedly Unauthorized Surgical
Procedures More Than Two Years Prior To Commencement
Of This Action.

The relevant limitation section of the Act codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987) and upon which the trial courts'
Order of judgment was based states:

-8-

No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. . . .
The adoption of this "discovery" rule givfes patients two years
to bring a claim against a health care provider.

This Court

declared that the statute begins to run when "an injured person
knows, or should know that he has suffered a legal injury."
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Uta^i 1979).
During his deposition on March 26, 1987, appellant Floyd
acknowledged that in consultations conducted prior to the 1981
operation, Dr. Lindem explained the anticipated hiatal hernia
operation and the procedure that constitutes such operation.
Following these consultations with Dr. Lindem, appellant
understood the limited surgical procedure for hiatal hernia
repair, also known as fundoplication:
Q.

Did you discuss with Dr. Lindem qn the first
visit you had with him what he recommended in
terms of surgery?

A.

No, I didn't ask him what he recommended.
told me what the surgery consisted of.

Q.

What did he tell you?

A.

Basically the same thing that Dr. Wilcox did.
That the hernia was a tear between the esophagus
and the stomach and what they would do is go in
there and pull the stomach up ove^: the esophagus
and tie it in.

Q.

What else did he tell you?

-9-

He

A.

That's basically it.
added.)

That was it.

(Emphasis

(Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at p. 83:14-24.)
Dr. Lynn Wilcox, a gastroenterologist had diagnosed appellants* hiatal hernia and referred the appellant to Dr. Lindem
for consultation.

Appellant testified that no mention was made

of any additional procedures to correct other stomach problems
by either Dr. Wilcox or Dr. Lindem.

Appellant testified that

his discussions with Dr. Lindem were restricted to the hiatal
hernia and did not concern treatment or surgery for stomach
ulcers:
Q.

You mentioned a repair of the hiatal hernia.

A.

That was all that was discussed.

(Id. at 84:25; and 85:1.) Appellant also testified that he
only authorized surgery to repair a tear between the esophagus
and the stomach by pulling the stomach over the esophagus and
tying it in.
Q.

Did you sign the consent form?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you give your consent to?

A.

I gave my consent to have a hiatal hernia
repaired.

(Id. at 88:6-9, 14-24; see also Record at 199.)
In an interview check-up conducted three or four months
after the December 1981 surgery, appellant testified that he
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was upset about physical problems he was experiencing, as was
his wife, who stated:
wrong with him.

"Damn it, Dr. Lindem, there's something

What did you do to him?"

Floyd Depo. at 96:4-5.)

(Record at 199;

Appellant testified that he then

discovered that additional allegedly unauthorized surgery was
performed.
And she [Mrs. Floyd] said, Well, what all did you
do to him? And that's when I found out about the
other part.
Q.

When was that?

A.

That was approximately three and a half or four
months after the surgery.

Q.

So that would have been perhaps March or perhaps
as late as April of 1982?

A.

I suppose so, somewhere around tnere.

Q.

And Dr. Lindem at that time told you that he had
done additional surgery?

A.

Yes, sir. She directly asked him what all they
had done, and he said, [1] we repaired the
hernia, [2] we removed a portion of his stomach
that was covered with ulcer scars, tissue, [3] we
cut the nerves in his stomach andj [4] opened up
the bottom of his stomach so he cfrn process his
food faster. (Emphasis added.)

(Floyd Depo. at 96:8-21 and Record at 199.)
Thus, appellant discovered in March or April of 1982 that
Dr. Lindem had operated extensively on the entire stomach
allegedly to treat gastric ulcer disease, aespite the lack of
any discussion regarding such additional surgery.
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It is clear that appellant could and did distinguish
between the hiatal hernia operation and the allegedly
unauthorized surgery in March or April of 1982.

Indeed,

appellant testified as follows:
Q.

In March or April of 1982, you learned for the
first time that Dr. Lindem had removed part of
your stomach?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Had cut the nerves to your stomach?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And had done a procedure to make the food move
through your stomach faster?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Surgery that you had never discussed with him?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Surgery you didn't ask him for?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And as far as you know, surgery you did not
consent to?

A.

That I did not?

Q.

You did not consent to?

A.

That's right.

(Record at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 97:2-18.)
Under these circumstances, appellant acknowledges his
discovery of a legal injury and its alleged cause more than two
years prior to commencement of this action, which discovery
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triggered the running of the applicaDie two year statute of
limitations.
B.

Appellant's Claims Are Absolutely Time-Barred Because
He Discovered The Cause Of Injury And Possibility Of
Negligence More Than Two Years PJrior To Commencement
Of This Action.

Within the first three or four months after the December,
1981 surgery, appellant immediately suffeted symptoms he had
not expected to accompany the hiatal hernia operation.
A.

It was about — it was within th^ first three or
four months after I had the surgery.

Q.

You hadn't expected to have diarrhea?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

That was getting continually worge?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You hadn't expected to have pain in your stomach?

A,

No.

Q.

And t h a t was g e t t i n g c o n t i n u a l l y ^/orse?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You hadn't expected to lose weight?

A.

No.

Q.

And now you were losing weight?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You hadn't expected to be depressed?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And you were getting depressed?

-13-

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you discuss these problems with Dr. Lindem?

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

(Floyd Depo. at 95:5-24.)
In March or April of 1982, Appellant attributed the cause
of the legal injuries and their related symptoms to allegedly
unauthorized surgery or the allegedly negligent conduct of
respondents:
Q.

Mr. Floyd, after your conversation with
Dr. Lindem in March or April of 1982, did you
have the understanding that the diarrhea you had
and the upset stomach and your weight loss and
the depression were due to Dr. Lindem1s performance of the surgery which removed a portion of
your stomach, cut the nerves to your stomach and
sped the food through your stomach?

A.

Yes, sir.

(Floyd Depo., pp. 97-98 lines 20-25, 1-2.)

Because appellant

discovered a legal injury and its alleged cause and the
possibility of negligence in March or April of 1982, nothing
more was required to commence the running of the two year
statute of limitations for medical malpractice.

Foil v.

Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
The fact that appellant had discovered a legal injury, its
cause and the possibility of negligence is further supported by
appellant's September 1982 visit to Dr. Wilcox.

In September

of 1982, appellant returned to Dr. Wilcox because of continuing
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health difficulties.

Appellant told Dr. Wilcox about the sym-

ptoms he was experiencing and explained that Dr. Lindem had
told appellant that the problems were common for that type of
surgery.

Dr. Wilcox forcefully stated that appellant "shouldn't

have that kind of problem with fundoplication [hiatal hernia
surgery]."

(Floyd Depo. at 99:14-15 and Record at 199.)

Appellant and his wife then told Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem
had performed surgical procedures in addition to the authorized
hiatal hernia operating:
A,

He said, no, you shouldn't have that kind of
problem with fundoplication or whatever it is. I
said, Well that's not all that was done. He
said, Yeah, it was. I said, No, sir, it wasn't.
My wife started getting upset. He said, It
wasn't all that was done? And my wife told him
what Dr. Lindem had told us, and ihe said, No,
they didn't do that. And she said, Well that's
what we were told.
Well, Dr. Wilcox called Dr. Lindem's office, I
don't know who he talked to there, whether it was
Dr. Lindem or his nurse or whatever, but
evidently they were reading him the reports and
he was listening and he said, Okay, thank you
very much and he hung up and looked at me and he
said, Well, I guess you was right, I didn't know
they done all of that. (Emphasis added.)

(Record at 99:14-25; 100:1-2.)
After performing diagnostic tests in September, 1982,
Dr. Wilcox told appellant that he had a "rapidly accelerated
gastric emptying rate, consistent with dumping syndrome," (Id.
at 100:16-18) a problem that appellant had been told he should
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not have had with fundoplication [hiatal hernia surgery].
(Floyd Depo. at 99:14-15.)
Because plaintiff discovered his injuries well before
November of 1983, the notice of intent to commence litigation
dated November 27th, 1985 was not timely filed and the
appellant's stale claims are absolutely time-barred by the two
year statute of limitations as a matter of law.
C•

It Is No Defense To Application Of The Statute Of
Limitations That (1) The Doctors Involved Indicated
The Appellant's Condition May Improve With Time Or (2)
That The Appellant Did Not Know The Full Extent Of His
Injuries.

It is no defense for waiting over three years to file a
notice of intent that a physician indicated that a patient's
condition would improve over time or that the patient does not
comprehend the full extent of injury.

In Hargett v. Limberg,

598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801
F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986), the court explained:
Under Foil v. Ballinger, and its progeny, a legal
determination of negligence is not necessary to start
the statute of limitations. Rather, the crucial
question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the
facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that he may have a cause of action against the health
care provider. Those facts include the existence of
an injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence.
Id. at 155.

(Citations omitted.)

In Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986), the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Utah District Court
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ruling that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitation^.
[P] laintif f s * counsel argues that [pllaintiff did not]
know the full extent of defendants* negligence, which
was only learned later. The district! court rejected
his argument, as do we. To adopt such reasoning
would, in practical effect, wipe out the statute.
Id. at 379 (emphasis in original.)

See a}Lso, Hove v. McMaster,

621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (holding there is no requirement to
wait for the pain to be diagnosed before the two-year statute
of limitations will bar a medical malpractice action); and
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah, 1982) (holding belief
condition complained of may be temporary father than permanent
did not prevent application of two-year statute of limitations
to bar plaintiff's claim).
Even though appellant argues that he did not know the full
extent of alleged unauthorized surgery and related injuries
until much later, the two year statute of limitations would
still apply to bar his claim.

Appellant testified that he

desired surgery to correct a long-standing problem diagnosed to
be a hiatal hernia which permitted food to reflux from the
stomach up into the esophagus, causing heartburn.

Appellant

knew the hiatal hernia surgical procedure tor correcting this
problem did not involve removing part of hts stomach, cutting
stomach nerves or enlarging the stomach opening to his intestines.

Nevertheless, appellant discovered the performance of
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these surgical procedures in 1982 and also learned that the
injuries he had allegedly suffered were not a result of the
authorized hiatal hernia operation.

Under these circumstances,

appellant "was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that he may have a cause of action against a
health care provider."

Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155.

Count III of plaintiff's Complaint, alleging fraudulent
concealment likewise lacks merit.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-14-4(1)(b) (1987) specifically requires:
In an action where it is alleged that a patient
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the
part of a health care provider because that health
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be
barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discover, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
Appellant, at the very latest, discovered that the physical
problems he was experiencing would not resolve without
additional surgery in September of 1984, more than on year
before commencement of this action.

(Record at 173, 1[ 9.)

Moreover, appellant candidly admits that respondents explained
the nature of treatment provided and surgery performed.
Accordingly, the only issue of concealment was whether
appellant authorized such treatment and that information could
not be concealed from appellant.
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POINT II
APPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE AN ISSUE
OF FACT SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
A.

Appellant's Post Deposition Contradictory Affidavit
Cannot Raise An Issue Of Fact.

At his deposition, appellant acknowledged that in 1982 he
discovered that (1) defendants allegedly performed unauthorized
surgery; (2) unexpected symptoms he was experiencing were
attributed to such unauthorized surgery; ^nd (3) the injuries
complained of allegedly resulted from negligence of respondents.
(Statement of Facts IHf 2 through 12.)

In connection with

respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, appellant attempted
to raise an issue of fact by stating, in aln affidavit, that he
had no knowledge of the injury, its cause or the possibility of
negligence until 1985.

In testing the credibility of such

post-deposition contradictory statement, this Court declared:
As a matter of general evidence l|aw, a deposition
is generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the
truth than an affidavit, since a deponbnt is subject
to cross-examination and an affiant isj not. . . . But
when a party takes a clear position in: a deposition,
that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit
which contradicts his deposition, unless he can
provide an explanation of the discrepancy. A contrary
rule would undermine the utility of summary judgment
as a means for screening out sham issues of fact.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted).

Appellant's acknowledgment that he discovered an
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injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence in 1982
were not modified on cross-examination, nor has any explanation
for the post deposition discrepancy been provided.
In Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979), this
Court declared that the plaintiff "cannot rely on mere
allegations or denials of their pleadings to avoid a summary
judgment, but must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial."

Genuine issues of fact cannot

be created through contradiction.
situation in this case.

Such appears to be the

The trial court properly rejected

appellant's attempt to manufacture an issue of fact.
B.

The Statute Of Limitations Began To Run In 1982,
Regardless Of Concealment, Because Appellant Learned
Of Information That Would Lead To Discovery Of The
Cause Of Action Through Diligence.

In Miller v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 1102, 1106-07
(7th Cir. 1985), the court, ruling upon the application of a
similar medical malpractice statute of limitations, held that
"[w]hen a plaintiff learns of information that would lead to
the discovery of the cause of action through diligence, the
statute of limitations begins to run regardless of concealment."
In Miller the plaintiff had a Dalkon Shield inserted into
her uterus in 1972.

In 1974, the plaintiff received emergency

medical care for a pelvic infection.

In connection with this

treatment, the Dalkon Shield was removed.
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In 1981, when the

plaintiff experienced difficulties becoming pregnant, she
consulted a physician who told her that he believed that the
plaintiff's infertility was due to the 1974 pelvic infection
which was probably related to use of the Oalkon Shield
intrauterine device.
The plaintiff testified in her deposition that her treating
physician told her in 1974 that the Dalkon Shield was a possible cause of her infection.

The plaintiff did not commence her

cause of action against health care providers until 1981. When
faced with a motion for summary judgment based on the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations which begins to run
from the date the plaintiff "knew or should have discovered
that she suffered an injury or impingement and that it was
caused by the product or act of another," plaintiff offered an
affidavit stating that in 1974 her treating physicians did not
advise her of any connection between her illness and her use of
the Dalkon Shield.

Under these circumstances, the court ruled

that:
The parties cannot thwart the purpose pf Rule 56 by
creating issues of fact through affidavits that
contradict their own depositions. . . . When a
plaintiff learns of information that would lead to the
discovery of the cause of action through diligence,
the statute of limitations begins to run regardless of
concealment.
Id. at 1104 and 1106-07. The Miller court also explained:
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Persons who know or should have discovered both the
injury and the cause "have a fair opportunity to
investigate available sources of relevant information
and to decide whether to bring their claims in court
within the time limitations in the statute. The
notion of a "fair opportunity to investigate" suggests
that discovering "the cause" is something less than
possessing irrefutable proof of causation. The
doctor's statement, by itself, informed [plaintiff]
. . . of the possible causal connection, and should
have prompted [plaintiff] . . . either to contact a
lawyer or to conduct her own inquiry. (citations
omitted.)
Miller, 766 F.2d at 1105.
The instant case is similar to Miller in several respects.
First, appellant Floyd learned of information (performance of
allegedly unauthorized surgical procedures) that would lead to
the discovery of a possible cause of action through diligence.
Second, appellant had a fair opportunity to investigate
available sources of relevant information and to decide whether
to bring his claim within the time limitation (Dr. Wilcox told
appellant that the injuries he suffered were not related to a
hiatal hernia operation).

Finally, appellant Floyd possessed

sufficient knowledge of possible causal connection between
injuries and his 1981 operation to have prompted him to either
contact a lawyer or conduct his own inquiry.
On all material issues relative to the application of
Section 78-14-4, there is no dispute as to the crucial facts
relied upon by the trial court in granting respondents' motion
for summary judgment.

Accordingly, appellant "cannot thwart
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the purpose of Rule 56 by creating issues of fact through
affidavits that contradict [his] own deposition."

Webster, 675

P.2d at 1104.
POINT III
THE CASE OF FOIL V. BALLINGER IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IN ^HE INSTANT
CASE.
This Court declared in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144
(Utah 1979) that the "statute [of limitations for medical
malpractice] begins to run when an injured person knows or
should know that he suffered a legal injury."
at 147.

Foil, 601 P.2d

This Court carefully safeguarded against tardy claims

by imposing "the requirement that a personj exercise reasonable
diligence in determining the nature and cause of his or her
injury."

Id. at 149.

In the instant case, appellant testified that he only
discussed and consented to hiatal hernia surgery which he
clearly understood to be simple repair of a tear between the
esophagus and the stomach, involving "pull[ing] the stomach up
over the esophagus and [tying] it in."
Floyd Depo. at 83:14-24.)

(Record at 199; and

Three to four months after surgery

and more than two years prior to commencement of this action
appellant discovered that the surgery performed was much more
extensive than the scope of discussions and alleged consent.
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The surgery involved removal of part of appellant's stomach,
severing stomach nerves and acceleration of his digestive
process through surgical enlargement of the stomach opening to
the duodenum, all of which were explained to appellant.

(Id.

at 199; and 96:17-21; 97:20-25 and 98:1-2.)
The facts of Foil are markedly distinguished from the facts
of the instant case.

In Foi1, the plaintiff was not apprised

of the cause of her injuries until a workmen's compensation
medical panel issued a written report concerning plaintiff's
medical condition.

In Foil, the plaintiff was simply unaware

of any act of negligence by an expert.

In contrast, appellant

in the instant case discovered within three to four months of
the injury that allegedly unauthorized surgery had been performed.

In addition, by April of 1982, appellant testified

that he attributed the cause of his injuries and related symptoms to the allegedly unauthorized surgery.

Thus, the trial

court's decision in this case is completely consistent with the
holding in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S IMPROPERLY RAISED CONSTITUTIONAL
ATTACK ON THE LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS OF THE
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
In his brief, appellant, for the first time, challenges the
constitutionality of the Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Health
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Care Malpractice Act, alleging that the statute of limitations
contained therein violates appellant's ribfhts to equal protection, due process and access to the courts.

See United States

Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution, Art. I,
§§ 11 and 24.

Appellant also argues, for the first time, that

the statute of limitations constitutes special legislation in
favor of health care providers.
Utah courts have strongly and consistently held that issues
raised for the first time on appeal cannot; be considered.

In

Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347
(Utah 1986), this court declared that an i|ssue not raised in
the pleadings or at trial cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.

This court also noted that the| record must clearly

show that an issue was "timely presented to the trial court in
a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thelreon; we cannot
assume that it was properly raised."

Franklin Financial v. New

Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).

Thus,

if a party fails to present an issue to thfe trial court, he or
she will have "waived the right to raise it" on appeal.
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 198^,.
w

Utah

In summary,

[i]t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the

parties in the trial [court] cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal.

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah

1983).
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In the instant case, appellant restricted his arguments to
the application of Section 78-14-4 and did not raise any of the
constitutional arguments enumerated in Points V through VII of
appellant's brief.

The record is completely void of any refer-

ence to appellant's newly raised constitutional arguments.
Accordingly, appellant's constitutional arguments cannot be
considered by this Court.
Even though appellant's constitutional arguments are not
proper subjects of appellate review, such arguments are
flawed.

This court has strongly and consistently upheld the

constitutionality of the provisions of the Act and the
limitations periods set forth therein "to protect and insure
the continued availability of health care services to the
public. . . ."

Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635

P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981).

Se<e also Yates v. Vernal Family

Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University
of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealey v.
Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30
(Utah 1981), this court upheld that constitutionality of the
Medical Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations,
concluding that the Act does not violate constitutional rights
of due process and equal protection; nor does the Act violate
prohibitions against special laws.
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This Court noted that:

[T]he Act was premised on the need to;protect and
insure the continued avail ability of health care
services to the public. . . . The legislature
exercised its prerogative in determining that the
shortening of the statute of limitation . . . would
insure the continued avail ability of Adequate health
care services. In the abs ence of a showing to the
contrary, we conclude that the legislature's
determination is not so ar bitrary or Unreasonable as
to exceed constitutional p rohibitions.
* * *

Having concluded that the classification is
reasonable, it follows that the limitation statute is
not constitutionally defective as a "^pecial law."
Allen, 635 P.2d at 32.

(Emphasis added.)

This Court has declared that Article l|, Section ll1 of the
Utah Constitution does not preclude the legislature from
prescribing a statute of limitations for time within which to
bring a cause of action.

Masich v. United] States Smelting,

Refining & Mining Co. , 113 Utah 2d 101, 19|l P.2d 612 (1948).
Indeed, "certain individual rights and remedies can be made to
yield to the public good."

Masich, 191 P.2d at 624.

Thus,

because there is nothing under the facts o£ the instant case to
distinguish the application of Section 78-14-4 from the

Article I, Section 11 provides: "All cou ts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to hi m in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy tj)y due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from rosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this stat , by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a arty."
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application of any other constitutionally permissible statute
of limitations, Section 78-14-4 should be upheld as valid
legislative response to specific public needs.

See Allen,

supra.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly concluded that appellant
discovered or through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered that he had sustained an injury and that
the injury was caused by negligent action more than two years
before he commenced an action against respondents.

Appellant

knew of alleged unauthorized surgery and attributed the cause
of his injuries to such surgery in 1982.

Nevertheless, he did

not commence this action until November of 1985.

Appellant

cannot now raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition to defeat application of Section
78-14-4 because a "contrary rule would undermine the utility of
summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of
fact."

Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73.

Likewise appellant's

flawed constitutional arguments should not be considered by
this court for the first time on appeal.
For these reasons, respondents respectfully urge this Court
to affirm the decision of the district court, thereby
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dismissing appellant's cause of action for failure to commence
his action within the time prescribed by law.

DATED this

T*

day of

JWXAJL

_ / 1988.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Ellioftft J . Williams
L a r r y \ R ) . Ijaycock
A t t o r n e y s jfor R e s p o n d e n t s

SCMLRL10 9

-29-

A D D E N D U M
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary Judgment Order
dated July 20, 1987

,

A-l

FILED IH GUftK'3 OFFICE
Salt Lake City. Ufch

JUL 2 0 1987
H. KxcnHfpdtov. Ciark 3r» DisUCourt

9y . q(Wf\u.—(J/ipftnfiA
V

-y

>

Woutv C/ferk

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants,
Western Surgical Associates, Inc.
and Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES FLOYD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

Civil No. 86-2223
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES,
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR.,
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D.,
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,

Judge Ricnard Moffat

Defendants.
The defendants', Western Surgical Associates, Inc.,
Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D., Lynn L. Wilcox, M.D. and
St. Mark's Hospital, Motion For Summary Judgment having come
on for argument on June 26, 1987, before ^he Honorable
Richard Moffat, plaintiff's counsel being represented by
Clayton Fairbourn, and defendants being represented by Elliott
Williams, Anthony Eyre, and Bruce Garner, the Court having

000186

heard argument on the matter and being fully advised in the
premises, now finds the following:
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered that he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action more than two years
before he commenced an action against the health care providers; consequently, his claims of medical malpractice are
barred by the statute of limitations prescribed in Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended) .
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, and that
the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to Rule 56, each party to bear their own costs.
DATED this^^g> day of July, 1987.

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Lynn F r e a r , being duly sworn, says t h a t she i s employed in the
law o f f i c e s of Snow, C h r i s t e n s e n & Martineau, a t t b r n e y s for
Western

Surgical

Associates,

Inc.

Defendants,

a n d Marjbin C« L i n d e m ,

M.D.

Jr.,

•

h e r e i n ; t h a t she served t h e a t t a c h e d

(Case No. 86-2223

,

Salt

Order

Lake

[County) upon the

parties

l i s t e d below by p l a c i n g a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy t h e r e o f i n an envelope
addressed t o :
D. C l a y t o n F a i r b o u r n
Fairbourn & Peshell
7321 South S t a t e S t r e e t
M i d v a l e , Utah 84047
J . Anthony Eyre
Kipp and C h r i s t i a n , P . C .
•
C i t y C e n t e r 1 , S u i t e 330
1 7 5 E a s t 400 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-2314

G a r y D. S t o t t
Richard^, Brandt, M i l l e r & Nelson
CSB Towfer, S u i t e 700
50 S o u t h M a i n S t r e e t
P . 0 . Bpx 2 4 6 5
S a l t La}ce C i t y , U t a h 84110

and causing t h e same t o be m a i l e d , f i r s t c l a s s , postage p r e p a i d , on the
9^day

of

July

1987.

Lynn F r e a r
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me t h i s 9 ^ ° day of

July

1987.
My commission e x p i r e s :
/ I

/W

Q*

\ ** /U

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residi*(g in Sa(lt Lake County, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents, postage prepaid,
to:
D, Clayton Fairbourn
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
Attorney for Appellant
Charles Floyd
7321 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 8 4 047
J. Anthony Eyre
Attorney for Respondent
Lynn L. Wilcox
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gary D. Stott
Attorney for Respondent
St, Marks Hospital
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

